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Desires are contentful mental states. But what determines the content of 
a desire? Two different classic answers were proposed by Russell and by 
Wittgenstein, starting in the s. Russell proposed a behaviourist ac-
count according to which the content of the desire is fixed by the type of 
state that puts an end to the relevant kind of behaviour which was trig-
gered by some initial discomfort. The desire’s content consists in its “sat-
isfaction conditions”. Wittgenstein criticized such an account for ne-
glecting the crucial point that the relation between a desire and its 
content is a conceptual, internal one, not an external contingent one. 
Desires specify their own contents, their “fulfillment conditions”. Even 
though there is a lot to say in favour of  Wittgenstein’s criticism, this pa-
per argues that Russell pointed at an important aspect of desires which 
plays a crucial role for accounts of self-knowledge of one’s own desires. 
It turns out fulfillment conditions and satisfaction conditions are tied 
together in rational self-knowledge of one’s own desires. In this sense, 
the views of Russell and Wittgenstein can be combined in a fruitful way. 
1. desires: two views
esires are intentional mental states: they have content. The 
content of a desire is part of what makes a desire the state it 
is; the other part is played by the fact that it is a desire and 
not some other type of state, like, e.g., a belief or a fear. But what is 
the content of a desire and what fixes it? What kind of relation is there 
between a desire and its content? Similar questions can be raised 
D
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about preferences and related “pro-attitudes”; for the sake of simplic-
ity we can restrict ourselves to desires here. 
 A first answer goes like this. Desires are propositional attitudes. It is 
true that we often talk as if desires are directed towards objects (“I 
want a drink”), activities (“I want to swim a bit now”) or events (“I 
want this to end”). However, I am assuming here, without further dis-
cussion, that all these ways of talking turn out to be propositional in 
nature if further specified (“You want a drink? What for? Is it that you 
want to quench your thirst with it? Pour it over my head? Oh, I see: 
you want that the barkeeper is happy!”). The content of a proposi-
tional attitude is the content of the relevant proposition or—if you do 
not believe in propositions—what the that-clause of the corresponding 
sentence describing the attitude specifies. The content of Annie’s want 
for a ham sandwich is that she gets a ham sandwich. The content of a 
desire determines what “fulfills” it: “fulfilling a desire” means making 
its propositional content true. Thus, the first answer to our question 
can be put like this: the content of a desire is its fulfillment condition 
(its content’s truth condition).1 
 Strictly speaking, a particular desire, like Ann’s desire that she have 
a ham sandwich, has a set of many fulfillment conditions (having a 
ham sandwich in front her, or having it while the radio is on, or while 
the sun is out, etc.). For simplicity’s sake we can speak simply of a 
desire’s fulfillment condition as the set of all those more specific con-
ditions. It should be added here that many reports of desires seem to 
underspecify the content: even though it might be true that Mary 
wants the quarrel between her friends to end, it might not be true that 
Mary wants the quarrel between her friends to end by shooting them.2 
Whether it is the semantics or the pragmatics of desire ascriptions that 
should deal with this problem and how it should be solved can be left 
open here (perhaps some of the content need not even be represented 
by the subject3).  
 There is a fundamentally different answer to our question about de-
sires and their contents. According to this second view, propositional 
1 There is no commonly accepted and shared use of terms like “fulfillment” and “sat-
isfaction”. The explanations given here should prevent any misunderstanding.  
2 See for this kind of issue Fara, “Specifying Desires” (), as well as Shier, “Direct 
Reference for the Narrow Minded” (), p.  passim, who distinguishes between 
characterizing and specifying the content of a desire. 
3 See Perry, “Thought without Representation” (). 
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content does not matter much or at all here. Desires are rather seen 
as certain states of the person or the organism and as typically (though 
not always) having, inter alia, certain behavioural effects. To give an 
example, Fred feels cold and approaches the heater; he soon starts to 
feel warm. The content of a desire, then, is identified with that state of 
affairs which puts an end to the state that caused the behaviour. It is 
typically (though not always) the cause of a state of satisfaction in the 
person or organism. It constitutes the desire’s satisfaction condition 
rather than its fulfillment condition (we can put cases aside here where 
there fails to be satisfaction; but see the next paragraph). Since there 
are many conditions that satisfy a desire we should rather say that the 
content is the set of all those conditions that satisfy the desire. For 
brevity’s sake I will simply talk about a “satisfaction condition” here. 
 The fundamental difference between these two views about the con-
tent of desires4 can be easily overlooked because often fulfillment goes 
hand in hand with satisfaction. Annie is hungry and she loves ham 
sandwiches: hence, getting a ham sandwich will as much fulfill her 
desire as satisfy it. However, fulfillment conditions and satisfaction 
conditions can diverge. What fulfills a desire need not satisfy it: Annie, 
after having eaten the ham sandwich she wanted to eat, might still be 
hungry or even more hungry than before, and she might even regret 
having gone for that ham sandwich. And, vice versa, what satisfies a 
desire need not fulfill it: even though Annie had a cheese sandwich 
instead of a ham sandwich it satisfied her wishes even better than a 
ham sandwich could have (which might not have satisfied her at all). 
 The satisfaction view of content emphasizes the motivational aspect 
of desires whereas the fulfillment view rather focuses on the inten-
tional (“aboutness”) aspect of desires. Some people, like Jerry Fodor 
for instance, thought that it is one of the main tasks in the philosophy 
of mind to bring these two aspects together and to explain how inten-
tional states can motivate behaviour.5 I will not go into this issue here. 
 According to the satisfaction view, desires are pretty close to drives 
and at least some of them are drives. Non-human animals certainly 
have desires in that sense—and humans probably, too, to some degree. 
 
4 See also, more generally Mácha, Wittgenstein on Internal and External Relations 
(), Ch. . 
5 See, e.g., Fodor, “Propositional Attitudes” (), pp. ff.; see also Dretske, Ex-
plaining Behavior (), p. , for the difference between fulfillment and satisfac-
tion. 
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Such desires need not be mental states in anything more than a prim-
itive or rudimentary sense. According to the fulfillment view, desires 
are more sophisticated mental states, perhaps even requiring the mas-
tery of a natural language.  
 According to the fulfillment view but not according to the satisfac-
tion view, attributions of desires are referentially opaque. According to 
the former view, it might be true that Stephane wants a piece of the 
cake on the left but it might not be true that Stephane wants a piece 
of the last Linzer Torte the chef produced last night (given that the 
cake on the left is yesterday’s last Linzer). To be sure, this holds for de 
dicto ascriptions of desires but not for de re ascriptions: if it is true that 
it is from the cake on the left that Stephane wants to eat, then it is also 
true (as we may assume for the sake of the example) that it is from the 
last Linzer Torte which the chef produced last night that Stephanie 
wants to eat—and vice versa. However, we can put this aside here be-
cause only de dicto ascriptions capture the kind of content that we’re 
interested in here. To say that Chuck desired of the hemlock to drink 
it, doesn’t specify what he wanted: to commit suicide or to quench his 
thirst, or something else altogether.  
 Also, according to the fulfillment view, desires support inferential 
relations with other attitudes, especially other desires and beliefs. This 
allows for an account of practical reasoning and rationality. Suppose I 
want to get into city centre quickly. Suppose further that I believe 
(correctly, let us assume) that the best way for me to get into city cen-
tre quickly is to take a train. As a rational person, I should then also 
want to take a train. My practical syllogism that I should take a train 
because doing this is the best way to get me where I want to be is a 
good one. The satisfaction view on the content of desires does not 
seem to allow for, or at least not suggest, this type of account of prac-
tical reasoning; it is certainly not easy to see how it could allow for or 
support any such account. 
 One might be tempted to think that there are two different kinds of 
desires at issue here. However, I do find this implausible. There is just 
one type of mental state called “desire” (in all its variations, of course). 
The relevant question rather is: What is the right view about the con-
tent of desires? The fulfillment view or the satisfaction view or a com-
bination of both or none of these? 
 peter baumann 
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2. russell
Bertrand Russell—at least at some points in his long career—thought 
that the satisfaction view gives the right answer to the questions above 
about the content of a desire. Ludwig Wittgenstein famously criticized 
a general account of propositional attitudes as well as a view on desires 
like the ones Russell defended. In opposition to Russell, Wittgenstein 
argued for the fulfillment view. I shall focus here on the disagreement 
between Russell and Wittgenstein.6 This is not merely of historical but 
also of systematical importance. It is interesting to everybody who is 
involved in the current debates on content. Let us consider Russell’s 
view first. 
 Starting in the s and then in particular in the preliminary stud-
ies to The Analysis of Mind around ,7 in The Analysis of Mind 
(), and in An Outline of Philosophy (published ) Russell puts 
forward a strongly behaviourist theory of motivation and action.8 Ac-
cording to this theory, desires are to be explained via behaviour cycles: 
A particular bodily state of an organism (e.g., lack of nutrition) ex-
presses itself in feelings of discomfort (e.g., hunger) and triggers a cer-
tain type of behaviour (e.g., approaching “foody” regions). This be-
haviour is “directed towards” or better, brings about a state of affairs 
that stops the behaviour by ending its triggering conditions, eliminates 
discomfort (e.g., by getting food) and brings about pleasure. Thus, 
6 One should keep in mind that as far as available texts are concerned, Wittgenstein’s 
critique started before Russell began to defend the kind of view Wittgenstein criti-
cized. I will not go here into questions about what has or might have been said in 
some of the many conversations between Russell and Wittgenstein in the s. 
When I talk about “Wittgenstein’s critique of Russell” in the following, I don’t want 
to imply a certain temporal order but rather intend to refer (for lack of a better and 
equally concise expression) to Wittgenstein’s critique of the kind of view Russell de-
fended for some time.—It is an interesting and important historical question whether 
the different views of Russell and Wittgenstein resulted, roughly, from their different 
responses to the problems of the multiple-relation theory of judgment that Russell 
held earlier (thanks to a referee for making this point!). I am not going to go into this 
here because this would lead to far away from the main aim of this paper; the focus 
here is not on the prehistory of the different views Russell and Wittgenstein held 
about the content and nature of desires.  
7 See Russell, “The Anatomy of Desire” (pts. i–iii, ), as well as “Analysis of 
Mind” () and “Miscellaneous Notes” (), published as  and  in Papers .  
8 See Russell, An Outline of Philosophy (), pp. ff., ff., ff.; AMi, pp. ff., 
ff., and “The Anatomy of Desire” (which largely overlaps with Ami ); “Analysis of 
Mind”, pp. ff., “Miscellaneous Notes”, p. ff. 
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according to Russell, the content of a desire consists in the “halting” 
conditions of the behaviour triggered by the desire. In other words, 
the content of a desire is its satisfaction condition. We can see here 
already that Russell’s account is not completely behaviourist since he 
allows for feelings, images and other “inner” states. But the behaviour-
ist element in his view is very strong.9 
 Russell says: “A hungry animal is restless until it finds food; then it 
becomes quiescent. The thing which will bring a restless condition to 
an end is said to be what is desired.”10 And, in more detail: 
A mental occurrence of any kind … may be a cause of a series of actions, 
continuing, unless interrupted, until some more or less definite state of 
affairs is realized. Such a series of actions we call a “behaviour-cycle”…. 
The property of causing such a cycle of occurrences is called “discom-
fort”; the property of the mental occurrences in which the cycle ends is 
called “pleasure”…. The cycle ends in a condition of quiescence, or of 
such action as tends only to preserve the status quo. The state of affairs in 
which this condition of quiescence is achieved is called the “purpose” of 
the cycle, and the initial mental occurrence involving discomfort is called 
a “desire” for the state of affairs that brings quiescence.11 
Russell does thus not individuate the content of a desire by indicating 
its propositional content but rather by referring to its satisfaction con-
dition.  
 Since it is a contingent fact that conditions of type A satisfy organ-
isms of type B if they are in states of type C, we can also call Russell’s 
account an “externalist” one. It also has certain similarities with causal 
functionalism in the philosophy of mind: 12 According to the latter 
view, desires are states individuated by characteristic types of causes, 
effects and relations to other mental states; according to Russell, de-
sires are states individuated by triggering conditions causing some rel-
evant type of behaviour and by halting conditions causing the end of 
that behaviour. Even though Russell only mentions the latter condi-
tions in the quotation above, we need to add the former given that the 
9 See also Griffin, “Russell’s Neutral Monist Theory of Desire” (), p. , or 
Kenny, Action, Emotion and Will (), p. . 
10 AMi, p. ; see also “Analysis of Mind”, p. . 
11 AMi, p. ; see also p. f.; “Analysis of Mind”, pp. f., ff.; OP, p. . 
12 See, e.g., Block, “Troubles with Functionalism” (). 
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same conditions can be halting conditions for different types of be-
haviour triggered by different kinds of states: Finding refuge inside a 
bank satisfies those who try to escape particularly bad weather as well 
as those who are reluctant to be seen by a nosy and chatty neighbour 
they just spotted on the street.  
 It should also be added briefly here that a Russellian account has to 
be careful to distinguish in principle between behaviour cycles and 
other types of feedback mechanisms (like a thermostat regulating the 
temperature in a room): Do the feelings of discomfort and pleasure 
make all the difference here? This points to a problem for Russell’s 
account. He discusses it briefly13 and invokes the availability of physi-
cal or mechanical explanations in the case of non-behaviour (natural 
processes or involuntary movements)—which makes one wonder why 
such explanations are not available in the case of the explanation of 
behaviour. We can leave the question open here whether this problem 
admits of a solution within the confines of Russell’s view.14 
 One further issue deserves to be mentioned at least briefly here. One 
might wonder what exactly counts as a desire, according to Russell. Is 
it the discomfort that triggers the whole cycle? This would identify de-
sire with a certain kind of feeling and not require any reference to be-
haviour; furthermore, feelings are not fine-grained enough to capture 
all the subtle differences between desires. Should one then identify 
desires with the pleasure at the end? This seems implausible on the 
face of it. Again, it would be hard to see how pleasure could be so fine-
grained as to capture the difference between desires: the desire that A 
win the election in country X is different from the desire that B lose 
the election in country X, but the pleasure might be just one and the 
same. Is the desire then to be identified with the whole cycle? Perhaps 
it is sufficient here to attribute to Russell the view that talk about a 
particular desire has the same truth conditions as talk about a partic-
ular behaviour-cycle. The further details can be left open here because 
we are rather interest in the notion of a content of some desire.  
 Russell’s view has some interesting implications which I want to 
mention briefly. According to Russell, we know our own desires in the 
same way in which we know other people’s desires: by observing be-
haviour and its cycles and by making inferences to the desire. There is 
 
13 See AMi, pp. –. 
14 See also Kenny, pp. –. 
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no “special” kind of experience available exclusively from the first-
person perspective (as opposed to the third-person perspective). 15 
There is no immediate or incorrigible self-knowledge here.16 Russell 
says: “I believe that the discovery of our own motives can only be made 
by the same process by which we discover other people’s, namely, the 
process of observing our actions and inferring the desire which could 
prompt them.”17 And, with regard to the satisfaction of a desire he 
says: “But only experience can show what will have this sedative effect, 
and it is easy to make mistakes.”18 Thus, Russell’s example suggests 
that a satisfaction view goes hand in hand not only with an anti-Car-
tesian but also with an anti-commonsensical stance on self-knowledge 
(assuming that common sense has it that we have special access to our 
own mental states). 
 
3. wittgenstein’s punch and russell’s issues 
 
I do not intend to go into the historical details of Russell’s many de-
bates with Wittgenstein and describe how any real debate between 
them went. Rather, I am interested in Wittgenstein’s critique of a Rus-
sellian conception of desire. It started in the Notebooks from –.19 
As is well known, Wittgenstein seems to have a “knock-down” argu-
ment against the kind of view Russell defended: “If I wanted to eat an 
apple, and someone punched me in the stomach, taking away my ap-
petite, then it was this punch that I originally wanted.”20 This objec-
tion is supposed to show that the conditions of cessation of a desire 
cannot determine the content of the desire.  
 According to Wittgenstein, the relation between a desire and its con-
tent is not an external, empirical one (as Russell thought) but an in-
 
15 See An Outline of Philosophy, p. f., and AMi, p. f. 
16 See AMi, pp. ff. 
17 AMi, p. . 
18 Ibid., p. . 
19 See Notebooks, p. ; Philosophical Remarks, §§ff.; Wittgenstein’s Lectures: Cambridge 
–, pp. , , ; Philosophische Grammatik, pp. , , , f., f.; Blue 
and Brown Books, pp. f., f.; Philosophical Investigations, §§f., ff., ff.; Zet-
tel, §§, . 
20 Philosophical Investigations, §; see Wittgenstein’s Lectures: Cambridge –, p. ; 
see also Griffin, p. , on the case of failure: wouldn’t Russell have to say, very 
implausibly, that the unintended and unwanted consequence is what was desired? 
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ternal, logical relation. Wittgenstein says: “Saying ‘I should like an ap-
ple’ does not mean: I believe an apple will quell my feeling of nonsat-
isfaction. This proposition is not an expression of a wish but of nonsat-
isfaction.”21 He says similar things in the Blue Book: 
 
It is a hypothesis that a particular feeling of hunger will be relieved by 
eating a particular thing. In Russell’s way of using the word “wishing” it 
makes no sense to say ‘I wished for an apple but a pear has satisfied me’. 
But we do sometimes say this, using the word “wishing” in a way differ-
ent from Russell’s. In this sense we can say that the tension of wishing 
was relieved without the wish being fulfilled; and also that the wish was 
fulfilled without the tension being relieved. That is, I may, in this sense, 
become satisfied without my wish having been satisfied.22 
 
 The relation between a desire and its content is an internal, logical 
one: “A wish seems already to know what will or would satisfy it; a 
proposition, a thought, what makes it true—even when that thing is 
not there at all!”23 And in the Cambridge Lectures from –, 
Wittgenstein says: “What you now wish or expect is not a matter of 
future experience; for your wish or expectation may never be ful-
filled.”24 Thus, Wittgenstein holds an “internalist” conception of de-
sires according to which the content of a desire consists in the propo-
sitional content of this practical attitude, i.e., in its fulfillment 
conditions. 
 Wittgenstein, too, draws some conclusions as to the nature of self-
knowledge. But different writings suggest different ones. In the Blue 
Book  Wittgenstein characterizes utterances like “I know what I want” 
as grammatical utterances25 In the Investigations, however, he claims: 
“ ‘I know what I want, wish, believe, feel, …’ (and so on through all the 
psychological verbs) is either philosopher’s nonsense, or at any rate 
not a judgment a priori.”26 The fulfillment view as such does not seem 
 
21 Philosophical Investigations, §. 
22 Blue and Brown Books, p. ; see Philosophical Investigations, §. 
23 Philosophical Investigations, §. 
24 Wittgenstein’s Lectures: Cambridge –, p. ; see Blue and Brown Books, p. f. 
25 See Blue and Brown Books, p. . 
26 Philosophical Investigations, p. ; see also here: McGuinness, “I Know What I 
Want” (–), pp. ff., and von Savigny, “I Don’t Know What I Want” (), 
pp. ff.; concerning the question whether a person usually or always knows what 
she wants and whether there is a difference between the first-person perspective and 
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to imply any particular view about first person access to the content 
of desires. 
 Is Wittgenstein right in his critique of Russell’s theory of desires? 
Wittgenstein’s remarks like the one about the wish for an apple and 
the punch in the stomach show at least two different things. First, Rus-
sell’s conception of satisfaction is much too broad and not satisfactory. 
A punch in the stomach may make my wish for an apple cease but it 
does not satisfy my wish—or at least, it very often does not do that. 
The cessation of a desire is something different from both the satis-
faction and the fulfillment of a desire. If I, for instance, finally resign 
and give up my wish to get some Spaghetti Carbonara today, my desire 
might peter out, but it is, of course, neither fulfilled nor satisfied. Rus-
sell’s theory of desire thus needs to be supplemented with at least a 
threefold distinction between cessation, satisfaction, and fulfillment of 
a desire. So, what is the difference between cessation and satisfaction? 
 I do not see why one should not, in principle, be able to repair this 
part of Russell’s theory. Satisfaction has an emotional or affective side 
that mere cessation (without satisfaction) lacks: the organism is 
pleased or relieved of discomfort, and this is an effect of the behaviour 
initiated by discomfort. Satisfaction is a special case of cessation. Per-
haps Russell’s “pleasure-condition” that the cessation of the relevant 
behaviour is pleasant to the organism (see above) can already take care 
of this point.  
 This also takes care of the worry that unrelated events might lead 
to pleasure or relief of discomfort. For instance, unbeknownst to me 
and not triggered by me, someone might have put a happy-making 
substance in my coffee. I drink my coffee and am very happy as a re-
sult. There are many functional equivalents to the agent’s behaviour 
which are not part of the their behaviour. If I don’t scratch my itchy 
elbow, someone else might. Even some event that does not constitute 
behaviour at all might do the job (a branch of a tree falling on my itchy 
elbow, taking away the itch). All this can happen, but in those cases 
the causal genealogy is not the relevant one: the pleasure or the relief 
of discomfort is not caused by some agent’s behaviour which itself was 
caused by the agent’s discomfort. It is a different story, of course, if 
my (intentional) making unhappy faces makes my close companion 
the third-person perspective here, see: Blue and Brown Books, p. ; Philosophical In-
vestigations, §§, ; Wittgenstein’s Lectures: Cambridge –, p. . 
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put some of their happy-makers into my coffee. 
 But there is another part of Russell’s account—a part that seems 
beyond possible repair. This leads to Wittgenstein’s second, main 
point against Russell: the relation between a desire and its content is 
an internal, logical one and not just an external, contingent, and 
“merely” causal relation. What Wittgenstein’s objection so convinc-
ingly shows (even if Wittgenstein does not spell it out in detail and 
does not offer an alternative account) is that Russell leaves out some-
thing important: he over-emphasizes the motivational aspect of desires 
and neglects their propositional attitude-aspect.27 
 Closely related to this problem is the fact that talk about desires 
creates intensional contexts whereas talk about states of an organism 
and its behaviour doesn’t. I might show theatre-visiting behaviour, but 
what is it about theatre performances that attracts me (pulls or pushes 
me there)? Is it the staging of some drama? Or rather the literary qual-
ities of certain plays? A behaviourist theory will tend to be way too 
coarse-grained in its analysis of desire in order to capture the fine-
grained, intensional structure of desire.28 
 There are more issues for Russell’s account (not mentioned by Witt-
genstein) which bring up more of such serious problems. It seems that 
not all desires lead to action or behaviour.29 My desire to travel to 
Paris (from far away) within ten minutes and without much cost does 
(due to my knowledge of the relevant facts) not lead to any specific 
behaviour. I might, of course, show linguistic behaviour and utter sen-
tences like “Oh, how nice that would be!” but then again, this need 
not be the case. It also does not help to insist that omissions as well as 
acts must be counted as behaviour: What action do I not perform be-
cause of the above desire? These problems arise for desires about the 
past or desires the fulfillments of which are impossible in some sense. 
A related problem arises in cases of conflicts of desires: both when the 
subject ends up paralysed and when one desire wins over the other.  
 One might respond that perhaps one can identify relevant counter-
factuals and dispositions to behaviour which are characteristic of a 
given desire, no matter whether the disposition is ever manifested or 
27 Griffin, pp. – discusses a statistical interpretation of Russell’s view (the dis-
comfort only “tends” to trigger behaviour of a certain sort) as a reply to Wittgen-
stein’s “punch” but rightly finds this wanting, too. 
28 See also Kenny, pp. –, on this as well as Griffin, p. . 
29 See, e.g., Bostock, Russell’s Logical Atomism (), p. . 
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not. My desire to travel to Paris in  minutes and without much cost 
would make me smile and say “yes!” if I encountered a credible offer 
(which I never will). One drawback of this proposal, however, is that 
it seems to change the theory very much and turn it into an altogether 
different theory. A desire does not trigger a disposition to behave a 
certain way but rather the behaviour itself. According to this proposal, 
desires would rather be taken to consist, partly, in such dispositions to 
behave a certain way. It is worth adding that Russell’s naturalism 
would have made him at least uncomfortable with such a counterfac-
tualist extension of his view.30 Apart from this, it is not clear how this 
could work in the case of desires for impossible things. It might be that 
the best way to rescue Russell’s account from this kind of problem is 
to restrict it to desires with behavioural effects. But this loss of gener-
ality is a high price to pay.  
 There are also serious circularity worries about Russell’s account. A 
desire for X is individuated and identifiable at least in part via a certain 
kind of behaviour, one that leads to X. But can one in turn understand 
the behaviour that leads to X in a “bare bones” behaviourist way, that 
is, without understanding it as intentional, as behaviour motivated by 
a desire for X ? Consider this case.31 Abe wants to kill Kay while climb-
ing. This makes Abe so nervous that he loses the grip on the rope 
which makes Kay fall to his death. Contrast this with a case where Abe 
loses the grip “intentionally” (this relates to be point above about un-
related functional equivalents). Only in the second case do we have a 
piece of behaviour relevant to the satisfaction of the desire. Can one 
distinguish behaviour from non-behaviour or relevant behaviour from 
irrelevant behaviour in a strictly behaviourist way without using the 
“intentional idiom”? Some might try to explain the difference using a 
notion of deviant causation; however, so far convincing accounts have 
been missing. I don’t want to rule out here that there can be solutions 
to this circularity worry but rather point to serious doubts one should 
have.  
 Harder to solve and closely related to this is another problem. Rus-
sell gives the following definition of “behaviour-cycle”: “A ‘behaviour-
cycle’ is a series of voluntary or reflex movements of an animal, tend-
ing to cause a certain result, and continuing until that result is cause, 
 
30 See Kitchener, “Bertrand Russell’s Flirtation with Behaviorism” (). 
31 See Davidson, “Freedom to Act” (), p. . 
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unless they are interrupted by death, accident, or some new behav-
iour-cycle.”32 There are certainly criteria for death that are independ-
ent from behaviourial criteria but what about accidents? What consti-
tutes an accident depends on what constitutes a behaviour-cycle; so, 
the latter cannot be individuated in a non-circular way via the for-
mer. 33  Similar problems arise for the individuation of behaviour-
cycles. Nothing in the behaviour itself seems to determine whether 
there is one longer cycle or rather an interrupted cycle followed by a 
complete cycle.34 
 One might reply that this type of circularity is not vicious and point 
out that many concepts are mutually explanatory in a non-problem-
atic way. However, the circularity we find here concerns terms of a 
theory which are at least to a great degree technical terms. Hence, the 
circularities above stand in the way of clarifying and understanding 
these terms as well as making use of them in illuminating explanations. 
In this respect it is a bad circularity. Therefore, Russell cannot just 
declare Wittgenstein’s punches to be mere accidents.  
 One may also wonder what makes the causal connection between 
discomfort, behaviour and resulting pleasure. In the case of unlearned 
behaviour this would just be “wired in”. But so much human or ani-
mal behaviour is learned. It is hard to imagine how the connection 
could be made without some learned representation of one’s environ-
ment,—some beliefs the organism has acquired and which it applies 
in specific situations. No learned behaviour seems conceivable with-
out this kind of cognition. Adding this to the theory makes it much 
less behaviourist and much more “cognitivist”. It is also already hard 
enough to see how discomfort or pleasure could be explained behav-
iouristically and in a non-circular way.35 
 Finally, there are some limitations which have already been men-
tioned above. Russell’s view cannot take account of the fact that stand-
ard, de dicto attributions of desires are referentially opaque: “Annie 
wants a ham sandwich from the store next door” does not imply “An-
nie wants one of the cheapest sort of sandwiches sold in the store next 
door”, even given that ham sandwiches in fact are the cheapest ones 
 
32 AMi, p. . 
33 See Griffin, pp. –. 
34 See Kenny, p. , and Griffin, pp. –. 
35 See also Kenny, pp. –. 
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you can get next door. Furthermore, Russell’s view cannot explain the 
inferential relations of desires with other states: For instance, it cannot 
explain how (i) wanting to get a ham sandwich and (ii) believing that 
they sell them in the store next door can lead rational Annie (iii) to 
want to go over to the store or even to go over to the store. How could 
we ever get to an account of practical reasoning on the basis of Rus-
sell’s view of desires?  
 It seems then that we have to choose between two ways of looking 
at Russell’s account of desires. We can see it either as an at best in-
complete but probably untenable view of desires and their contents in 
general. Or we can see it as a more complete view of one very special 
type of desires, namely basic drives. Since the latter option was not 
Russell’s aim and is not very interesting due to its restriction, we have 
good reasons to favour the first interpretation. This, however, must 
appear very unwelcome to any Russellian.  
4. putting russell and wittgenstein back together again36
Does all this mean that Wittgenstein “wins” and Russell “loses” the 
philosophical ping-pong game? Do satisfaction conditions have noth-
ing at all to do with the content of desires? No, it is not that simple. 
To be sure, the relation between a desire together with its content (re-
specting fulfillment) on the one hand and its satisfaction on the other 
hand is an external, contingent one. But isn’t there still a close, inter-
nal connection between (a) having a belief about one’s desires and 
their contents and (b) having a belief about the satisfaction conditions 
of one’s desires? If not, the following sentence—taken as an expression 
of a belief about one’s desires conjoined with a belief about that 
desire’s satisfaction conditions—would have to be acceptable: “I want 
to eat an apple but that won’t satisfy me!” However, such an utterance 
sounds quite infelicitous or even “paradoxical”. One might even be 
reminded of Moore-paradoxical propositions.37 
It is remarkable that in the Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology 
36 The aim of this section is not to develop a more Wittgenstein-friendly Russellian view 
in any detail (e.g., in the light of the above-mentioned non-behaviourist elements in 
Russell’s thinking at the time). My aim is rather to argue for the possibility of a “rec-
onciliation” between the two views.  
37 See Moore, “Russell’s Theory of Descriptions” (). 
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Wittgenstein himself considered a similar sentence. 38  One can, of 
course, say something like “I want an apple but that won’t satisfy me 
completely because I could eat much more than that!” or “If I’m not 
allowed to have a steak, and if you force me to choose between fruits, 
then I want an apple even though that won’t satisfy me at all and only 
dissatisfies me a bit less than the other fruits!” Cases like these are, of 
course, unproblematic. However, what the “paradoxical” case above 
shows is that it would be irrational not to give up a wish if one is con-
vinced that its fulfillment would not be satisfying at all or choice-wor-
thy in any way. “I want to eat an apple but that won’t satisfy me!” is 
paradoxical if interpreted in the sense of “I want to eat an apple but 
that won’t satisfy me in any way!” or of “I want to eat an apple but 
that will dissatisfy me more than anything else on the menu!” Rational 
persons cannot believe they have a certain desire without also believ-
ing that its fulfillment will be satisfying (in the relevant sense). One 
could perhaps even go one step further and claim—based on a theory 
of radical interpretation like the one defended by Donald David-
son39—that the case of a subject believing both conjuncts (the one 
about the desire and the one about the lack of satisfaction) is not even 
a case of irrationality but rather a case of “collapse of belief”. Such a 
person could not be taken to have beliefs about a given desire, its ful-
fillment and its satisfaction, in the first place. However, I don’t want 
to make such strong assumptions about interpretability here and will 
rather go with the idea that there is a rationality constraint binding 
beliefs about desires and beliefs about satisfaction together.  
 Consider the example of a reluctant drug addict who wants to stop 
taking the drug but simply cannot stop taking it.40 Even if he believes 
38 See Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, i: : “Denk dir, Einer sagte “Ich wün-
sche,—will aber nicht, daß mein Wunsch befriedigt werde.—(Lessing: “Wenn Gott 
in seiner Rechten …”) Kann man also Gott bitten, den Wunsch zu geben, und ihn 
nicht zu erfüllen?” (my translation: “Think of someone who said “I want,—but don’t 
want, that my wish will be met.—(Lessing: “If God in his right hand …”) Can one 
thus ask God, to give us the wish but not to meet it?”). The sentence Wittgenstein 
mentions here is not quite of the kind discussed above but similar. The German verb 
“befriedigen” when applied to a wish might sound as if it refers to satisfaction but it 
doesn’t: it refers to the fulfillment (“erfüllen”) of a wish. To self-ascribe a wish while 
also wishing for its non-fulfillment might be possible only in special cases like ones 
of addiction (see below).  
39 See Davidson, “Incoherence and Irrationality” (). 
40 See, amongst others, Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Per-
son” (), p. . 
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that the fulfillment of his addictive desires is satisfying in some respect, 
this belief is “cancelled out” by the belief that, all things considered, 
the fulfillment of his addictive desires is not satisfying (more dissatis-
fying than satisfying). Hence, he is irrational not only because he de-
sires something that, according to his own best judgment, will not sat-
isfy him. He also believes that he desires something that, according to 
his own best judgment, will not satisfy him. All this illustrates that for 
rational people the belief that one has a desire that p, comes with the 
belief that p would be satisfying for oneself. Desire and satisfaction 
are, so to speak, internally connected via the belief rational people 
hold about the fulfillment and the satisfaction aspect of their desires; 
more precisely, the belief that one has a desire D and the belief that 
fulfilling D will be satisfying to some degree (and not too dissatisfying 
in other respects) are internally connected with each other—even 
though, as Wittgenstein rightly states, the relation between desire and 
satisfaction is a merely external one. 
 As time goes by, people learn what kinds of states of affairs are sat-
isfying (and to what degree) and which ones not.41 Among the things 
people learn is to produce behaviour with satisfying effects (Russell 
could argue like that42). Hence, by and by a person can come to wish 
that p because and insofar as she thinks that p being the case would be 
satisfying. Often desires are based on beliefs as to whether the fulfill-
ment of the desire would be satisfying. The satisfaction aspect can 
even be part of the propositional content of the desire. It would be 
incorrect to assume that this is excluded by the concept of a desire’s 
content. Hungry Annie might want to eat a ham sandwich “under the 
description”43 that eating kills hunger, eliminates the desire to eat, and 
is satisfying. If the propositional content of a desire refers to the con-
ditions of satisfaction of the desire, then the desire becomes partly self-
referential. Then, the desire that p is at least partly a desire that itself 
be satisfied. This self-reflectivity, however, is not a universal trait of 
desires.44 
41 See Sobel, “Full Information Accounts of Well-Being” (), p. . 
42 See Russell, “Analysis of Mind” (), p. . 
43 See Anscombe, Intention (), sec. , pp. – passim. 
44 See Schiffer, “A Paradox of Desire” (), p. ; about self-reflective intentions 
see Searle, Intentionality (), pp. ff., and Harman, “Practical Reasoning” 
(), p. . 
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5. conclusion 
 
Let me recapitulate. First, Wittgenstein rightly objects against Russell 
that the content of a desire is its propositional content and not its sat-
isfaction condition. The internalist account of content according to 
which the content of a desire is not merely contingently related to the 
desire is the right one (as I said above: this does not rule out that con-
ditions of satisfaction can be part of the propositional content). But 
second, Russell’s view suggests or at least helps us develop an im-
portant point which Wittgenstein missed: desire, fulfillment and satis-
faction are indirectly related to each other, namely via the beliefs of a 
rational person concerning them; for rational subjects, the belief that 
one desires that p comes with the belief that p would be satisfying. We 
can thus say that both, Russell as well as Wittgenstein, have not only 
made important points in the debate but could have reached a com-
mon view beyond dispute. Moreover, this common view constitutes 
an important insight into the rationality conditions pertaining to 
thoughts and beliefs about one’s own desires,—an insight that de-
serves to be explored much more than it has been so far. The proposal 
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